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[So F. Nos. 18118, 18359. In Bank. Mar. 17,1953.] 
SARA JANE TALBOT DIMON, Respondent, V. CHARLES 
. GRAYSON DIMON, Appellant. 
(1] Divorce-Permanent Alimonr-BDstence of JIarltal Btatu 
.. Prerequisite.-In this state a wife's right to recover ali· 
mony or support is limited to the period when the parties' 
are husband and wife. 
[2] 14. - ~emporary Alimonr - Jurisdiction. - Language of Civ. 
Code, 11136, 137, 139, shows a COD8istent legislative purpose 
to eonftne powers of court to decree support to the period 
'when actioD8 for divorce, annulment and separate maintenance 
are pending, including time on appeal and sueb further time 
as may be within scope of decree in the particular action. 
[8] JcL-~emporary AlimoQ-AppUeation.-An application for 
alimODY is a collateral proceeding or episode within the di-
vorce action, authorized for a particular purpose, but de-
pendent for its maintenance on eDstenceof the action. 
['] JcL-Permanent AlimoQ--JurisdictiOD.-Court has no juris-
dictiOD to make an award for alimony to a wife who previ-
Melt. Dig. Befermces: [1, 5] Divorce, § 198; [2] Divorce, § 178; 
[3] Divorce, § 181; [4] Divorce, 1200; [6,11] Parent and Child, 
§ 28; [7] Parent and Child, § 36; [8] Parent and Child, 130; 
[9] Divorce, 1295; [10] Divorce, 11295, 296; [12] Parent and 
Child, 126; [13] Husband and Wife, 1178. 
.I 
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ously had obtained a final divorce decree based on oonstruc-
tive lervice only, regardless of whether decree was obtained 
in this or some other state. 
[6] Id.-Permanent Alimony-Application After Divorce.-What-
ever may be effect of Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law 
enacted in 1951 (Stats. 1951, vol. 1, p. 1906; Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1650 et seq.), a former wife who obtained a divorce in 
another state had no right, at time action was brought in 
this state in 1947, to pursue claim against former hnsband 
for alimony, either past or future. 
{6]Parent and Child-8upport of Kinor Ohild-Actions to Oom-
pel Support.-A divorced wife who has euatody of minor 
children of marriage may bring an action against the father 
for their support. . 
[7] Id. - Support of Kinor Child -.Oriminal BespoDSlbllity fur 
Nonsupport.-Mere fact that divorced mother of minor child 
is legally entitled to its custody does not relieve father from 
criminal liability for failure to provide for such child. (Pen. 
Code, I 270.) 
[8] Id. - Support of Minor ChUd - Oriminal Besponsibllity for 
Nonsupport.-8ince Pen. Code, I 270, applies to a father of 
either a legitimate or illegitimate minor child, the existence 
of the marital status is not a prerequisite to criminal lia-
bility for failure to .provide for child. 
[9] Divorce-8upport and Maintenance-Actions or Orders Sub-
sequent to Deeree.-Civ. Code, § 138, as it existed in 1947, 
authorized an action for the support and maintenance of 
minor children of a marriage although the marriage had been 
terminated by a divorce decree. 
[lOa, lOb] Id.-8upport and Maintenance of Ohildren-Actions or 
Orders Subsequent to Decree.-A divorced wife may main-
tain an action for support of minor children of the marriage 
insofar as such action relates to future support of such 
children; the former husband may not be required to reim-
burse her for any expenditures ahe may have voluntarily 
made in that behalf. 
[11] Parent and Ohild-8upport of Minor Ohild-Actions-J'uris-
diction.-An action by divorced wife against former husband 
. for future support of minor children of the marriage is a 
personal one and, being personal, it is transitory and may be 
brought in any state where defendant can be found. 
I [6] See Oal.Jur., Parent and Child, § 14; Am.Jur., Parent and 
Child, § 35. 
[7] See Oal.Jur., Parent and Child, § 20. 
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[12] Id.-Support ot KiDor OhUd-Liabilit)' &8 Mected bJ AbU-
it)' to 8upport.-ln action by a divorced wife against former 
husband for support of minor children of marriage, a finding 
that defendant is a strong, healthy and able-bodied man, that 
he has wilfully abstained from reasonable efforts to obtain 
employment and is capable of earning $500 to $1,000 per 
month is not sustained by evidence ~at he is and has been 
Binee the divorce in ill health and dependent on an aunt for 
support, that' the only businC88 in' which he has been gain-
fully employed and experienced is the ahippingbusineas, that 
his employment in 8uch business was lost .. to him without his 
fault, and that be.l1as since 80ught employment ,without 88~ 
eeas. 
{lS] Husband and Wite--t'ransactions Inter 8e-Trusts.-In for-
mer husband's cross-action to establish that property pur-
chased with money belonging to him is held by former 'Wife 
in trust for him, findings that she acquired major portion of 
property by gift from him, and that remainder was neces-
sarily sold to meet his obligations, are 88stained by 8ubstan-' 
tial evidence to that effect. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco and from an order award- . 
ing counsel fees, costs and support for minor child during , 
pendency of appeal. 1. L; Harris, Judge. Judgmentaflirmed 
in part and reversed in part: order reversed. " ,. 
Action by former wife for maintenance and support of 
herself and children, in which husband filed. cross-complaint ; 
to establish a trust. Judgment for plaintUf on eross-complaint j' 
affirmed; judgment for plaintift on original complaint, re-, 
versed., .:-'{ 
Johnson, Harmon &. Henderson and Robert H. Johnson' 
for Appellant. 
Samuel L. Fendel and Gerald D. Marcus for Respondent. 
SHENK, J.-This is an action by a former wife against 
her former husband to obtain past and future alimony for 
herself and past and future support for the children of 
the . marriage previously terminated by . a divorce in Con-
necticut. The defendant interposed a cross-complaint al-
leging that certain real and personal property is held by 






Mar. 1953] :DIKON V. DIMON 
no C.1d 1118; 1M P.1d 818] 
519 
The trial court by judgment entered on the 25th of No-
vember, 1949, awarded the plaintiff $1,950 for "alimony 
and support" for herself from the date of the Connecticut 
decree until her remarriage on August 31, 1948; also $1,850 
for the "support, care and maintenance" of the two minor 
children from date of that decree until the commencement 
of this action on August 4, 1947; also the sum of $37.50 
per month for the support of each child from the commence-
ment of this action until majority. The judgment included 
an award of $500 counsel fees and $48.15 costs. On the 
cross-complaint the judgment was that the defendant take 
nothing. The defendant appealed from the judgment and 
the whole thereof. After the appeal was taken the court 
on the plaintiff's motion made an award of $750 counsel 
fees, $250 costs and $37.50 per month for the support of 
the child who was still a minor during the pendency of the 
apPf'al. There is also an appeal from that order. 
The parties were married in Oregon in 1926. In 1945 
they separated. In March, 1946, the plaintiff wife obtained 
a divorce in Connecticut based on constructive service only. 
That decree awarded the custody of the two children to 
the plaintiff and purported to award alimony and child 
support to the plaintiff. 
Both parties are nonresidents of this state. The plaintiff 
and the children live in Oregon, and the defendant in Nevada. 
The suit was brought by the plaintiff suing in her own name 
and right to recover money she had paid out for past sup-
port of the children and herself, and for future alimony 
and support of the children. The ehildren are not parties 
to the action. The plaintiff concedes that the "in personam" 
provisions of the Connecticut decree . cannot be enforced, 
and the present action is not based on those ·provisions. 
The primary question eoncerns the jurisdiction of Cali-
fornia courts to enforce a sllpport obligation of a nonresident 
fonner husband under the foregoing circumstances. 
,[1] An examination of the law on the subject' indicates 
merit in the defendant'. eontention that in this state a 
wife '. right to recover alimony or support for herself is 
limited to the period when the parties are husband and 
wife. 
Section 136 of the Ch11 Code provides: UThough judg-
ment of divorce il'l denied, the court may, in an action for 
divorce, provide for the maintenance by· the husband, of 
the wife and children. • . ." 
·520 DIMON tI. DIMON {400.M 
Section 187, as it existed at the time this action was com-
menced provided that, "When an action for divorce is pend-
ing" the court may require the payment of alimony or sup-
port. It also provided that IIDuring the pendency of any 
such action" the court may require payments for alimony, 
costs, attorney's fees and support and maintenance. 
Section 139 as it existed at the time of the commencement 
of this action provided that "Where a divorce is granted 
for an offense of the husband, the court may compel him 
to . . • make such suitable allowance to the wife for her 
support . . • as the court may deem just. . . ." 
[2] The language of these sections shows a consistent 
legislative purpose to confine the powers of the court to 
decree support in any form to the period when actions for 
divorce, annulment and separate maintenance are pending, 
including time on appeal and such further time as may be 
within the scope of the decree in the particular action. Th(' 
amendments to sections 137, 138 and 139 since this action 
was commenced (Stats. 1951, vol. 2, p. 3910) do not change I 
the provisions of these sections in matters here relevant. 
Primarily, the amendments broaden the provisions for sep-
arate maintenance where the marriage still exists. The lan-
guage employed indicates a continued legislative purpose 
to limit the time during which application for alimony and 
support may be made. Our courts have consistently recog-
nized that the existence of the marital status is a prerequi-
site to the granting of alimony (Colbert v. Colbert, 28 Oa1.2d : 
276,279 [169 P.2d 633] ; Ca.rbone v. Superior Court, 18,Oal. 
2d 768, 771 [117 P.2d 872, 136 A.L.R. 1260] ; Ta.lbot v. TGl-
bot, 218 Cal. 1, 2 [21 P.2d 110]). [8] The application for 
alimony has been held to be a collateral proceeding or epi. 
sode within the action for divorce, authorized for Ii par· 
ticular purpose, but dependent for its maintenance upon 
the existence of the action. (Kellett v. Marvel, 9 Cal.App. 
2d 629, 630-631 [51 P.2d 185] ; see, also, Dunphy v. Dunphy, 
161 Cal. 87, 91 [118 P. 445]; Hite v. Hite, 1240al. 389, 
393 [57 P. 227, 71 Am.St.Rep. 82, 45 L.R.A. 793]; Sharon 
v. Sharon, 67 Cal. 185, 197 [7 P. 456, 635, 8 P. 709].) 
[4] In Howell v. Howell, 104 Cal. 45 [37 P. 770, 43 Am. 
St.Rep. 70], it was held that the court had no jurisdiction 
to make an award for alimony to a wife who previously had 
obtained a final decree of divorce based on constructive service 
only. The court relied upon the provisions of the Civil Code 
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only "when an action for divorce is pending" (Civ. Code, 
§ 137). The case at bar is a close parallel' to 'the 'Howell 
case, with the exception that in the present case the plain-
tiff's prior divorce decree was not issued by a court of this 
state and she seeks relief in a new and independent action. 
To permit her to prevail in this action would dord greater 
relief than would be available to her had she been a resi· 
dent of this state and brought her original action here. The 
Howell decision bas been followed, in numerous cases, includ-
ing McClure v. McOlure, 4 Cal.2d 856, 359 [49 P.2d 684, 
100 A.L.R. 1257]; Tolle .v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.2d 95, 97 
[73 P.2d607]; Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833;84:1 1136 
P.2d 1] ; Oalh.oun v. Oalhotm, 70 Cal.App.2d 233, 237 1160 
P.2d 923] ; Patterson v. Patterson, 82 Cal.App.2d 838, 842 
[187 P.2d 113]; Hinson v. Hinson, 100 Cal.App.2d745, 
746 [224 P.2d 405]. . 
The plaintiff seeks to distinguish the Howell case on the 
ground that the aetion there was brought upon the prior 
divorce decree, whereas in the present case the action is 
one in equity, so called, and not dependent upon the pro-
visions of the codes. It is claimed that the superior courts 
of this state have the same jurisdiction in equity possessed 
by the English courts of chancery unless prohibited by statute 
(Tulare 1": Dist. v. Superior Oourl, 197 Cal. 649, 660 
[242 P. 725]); that although the code sections provide no 
authority for the cause of action she has attempted to state, 
they do not prohibit such an action; that "for every wrong 
there is a remedy" (Civ. Code, § 3523); that the powers 
of a court of equity should not be "confined by rigid roles ' 
of law," and 'that "its powers should be so broad as to be 
capable of dealing with novel conditions." (Citing Bechtel 
v. Wier, 152 Cal. 443, 446 [93 P. 75, 15 L.R.A.N.S. 5491.) 
If the plaintiif's arguments are to prevail the provisions 
of the Civil Code which have been held to prohibit remedies 
similar to that which she seeks must be disregarded. How-
ever it is urged that the long "Continued application of the 
code sections has placed Califomia out of harmony with 
other states of the Union; that it permits the husband to 
desert his family andftee the matrimonial domicile to the 
haven which the laws of this state afford him; that the wife 
is put to the election either of never divorcing him in a juris-
diction where she cannot get personal service on him, or of 
sacrificing the right to alimony however necessitous her cir-
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where she is, as here, the actor in the case she is put to the 
election of seeking a divorce in a jurisdiction where personal 
service on her husband may be obtained .or of proceeding in 
a jurisdiction where subsequent awards of alimony are au-
thorized, such as Massachusetts (Annotated Laws of Massa-
chusetts [1951], vol. 6, p. 484) and New Jersey (New Jer-
sey Rev.Stats. [1937], vol 1, tit. 2, p. 269). There are 
states wherein the courts have recognized that when a hus-
band is the actor and has secured a divorce from an ab-
sent wife, the latter is permitted to claim alimony in a later 
suit. (Turner v. Turner, 44 .Ala. 437; Dtwi8 v. Davis, 70 • 
Colo. 37 ; Tkurston v. Thur8ton, 58 Minn. 279 [59 N.W. ' 
1017] ; Crawford v. Crawford, 158 Miss. 382 [130 So. 688]; 
Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502 [2 .A.m.Rep. 415]; Toncray v. , 
Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476 [131 S.W. 977, Ann. Cas. 1912C 284, . 
34 L.R.A.N.S. 1106].) In Hutton v. Dodge, 58 Utah 228 
[198 P. 165], the court allowed a wife to bring a subse-
quent action for alimony where, in the prior divorce action 
.on constructive service by the Wife in that state, the de-
cree specifically provided that it was subject to modifica-
tion, as to alimony, at any time upon notice .of motion . 
by the plaintiff served upon the defendant within the state. 
Here the plaintiff would distinguish many .of the cases 
(see McFarlane v. McFarlane, 43 Ore. 477 [73 P. 203, 
75 P. 139] ; HaU v. HaU, 141 Ga. 361 [80 S.E. 992] ; Darby 
v • . Darby, 152 Tenn. 287 [277 S.W. 894, 42 A.L.R. 1379]; / 
.Kelleyv. Kelley, 317 Ill. 104 [147 N.E. 659]; Doeksen v. 
Doeksen, 202 Iowa 489 [201 N.W. 545], Staub v. Staub, 170 
Md. 202 [183 A. 605]) which take a view contrary to her 
theory .of relief on the same basis' that she would distinguish 
HoweU v. Howell, BUpNJ, 104 Cal. 45, namely, that the wife 
in those cases attempted to reopen the divorce suit and mod- .. 
ify that decree to provide for support rather than bring a, 
new and independent action. However, the court in the 
Howell case stated that "after the judgment granting the 
,pivorce the plaintiff was n.o. longer the wife .of the defend-
ant; and he owed her no longer any ·marital duty. From 
that . time on she could enforce against him no .obligati.on 
not imposed by the court at the time .of the judgment." This 
8~tement in effect bas been repeated many times by the 
courts of this state. 
[5] It is concluded that at the time this action was 
brought there was no authority in this state supporting the 
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or future; and that appears to be our law at the present time~ 
It may be of interest to note that in 1951 the Legislature en-
acted the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law (Stats. 
1951, vol. 1, p. 1906; Code Civ. Proc., § 1650 et seq.). The 
purposes of that law are "to improve and ~xtend by reciprocal 
legislation the enforcement of duties of 8Upport and to make 
uniform the law with respect thereto." (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1651.) Brielly the act provides that a party entitled to sup-
. port may file a complaint in the court of the county of her 
residence, naming as defendant the alleged obligor and giving 
his address in the state having reciprocal legislation. A cer-
tificate is transferred to a court in that state which may' 
obtain jurisdiction over the person of the defendant alid 
conduct a hearing. Such a court may then enter an appro-
priate order commanding the defendant to pay into court the 
award in favor of the plaintiff. This act did not become 
effective until after the present action was commencecl and 
it is not claimed that it comes within the provisions of the act. 
Any further extension of the duties of support is a legisla-
tive function. It was 80 recognized by the 1951 Legislature 
when it enlarged to lOme extent the relief theretofore not 
available under our existing statutes. . 
There is a further question which involves the distinction 
between the plaintiff's alleged claim for ·support for hel'8Edf; 
and support for her minor children. [8] It ur the law of 
this state that a divorced wife who has the custody of minor 
ehildren may bring an action against the father for ·their 
support (Dizon v. DiZon, 216 Cal. 440 [14 P.2d 497] ; Dames 
v. Fisher, 34 Cal.App.'137 [166 P.:833]"); ['1] Penal Code, 
section 270, provides for criminal liability of a father who 
fails to provide for his minor child; and he is not relieved 
from that liability "merely because the mother of such child 
is legally entitled to the custody of such child .... " [8] 'Since 
it applies to a "father of either a legitimate or illegitimate 
minor child," the existence of the marital status is not a 
prerequisite to liability. [9] Civil Code, seCtion 138, 'as 'it 
existed at the time this action was brought, provided that" In 
actions for divorce the court may, during the pendency of the 
action, or at the final hearing or at any time thereafter dur-
ing the minority of any of the children of the marriage, make 
snch order for the custody, care, education, maintenance and 
support of such minor children as may seemnecessal'y or 
proper .••. " Unlike the construction given to those sections 
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mony and support (Civ. Code, §§ 136, 137 and 139) this sec-
tion has long been held to authorize an action for the support 
and maintenance of the minor children of a marriage al-
though the marriage has been terminated by a divorce de-
cree. (McKay v. McKay, 125 Cal. 65 [57 P. 677].) Civil 
Code, section 137.1, enacted in 1951 after the complaint herein 
was filed, provides: "When a father or mother has the duty 
to provide for the support, maintenance and education of 
the children of the father and mother and wilfully fails to 
provide for such support . • 0, the fath~r or mother, as. the 
case may be 0 0 • may maiDtaiIi an action in the superior -
court against the mother or father . .• as the case may be, 
for the support, maintenance and education of said children. "-
The effect of this provision does not appear to have been 
judicially declared. However, it is a legislative enactment 
of the case law as it existed at the time this action was com-
menced. 
[lOa] While the plaintiff in this case may maintain an ae-' 
tion for the support of the minor children of the marriage, no 
case has been referred to where an award for other than future 
support has been made. In McKay v. McKay, tuFa, 125 Cal. 
65, the court decreed an award against the father for the • 
maintenance and support of the minor children of a mar- ' 
riage previously terminated by divorce, but denied the wife's 
. claim for. reimbursement for money she bad paid out in 
support of the children prior to any order of the court . 
directing the lather to maintain and support the children~. 
The court stated at page 791: "The question of the father'~ ~ . 
liability for the care and support of his children after aJ 
decree of divorce, in which their custody has been awarded ~i 
to the mother; has been frequently presented in actions broughtj 
therefor by strangers, or by the mother, and the courts have! 
almost invariably held that an action against him to enforce i 
such liability could not be maintained. . . . [Citations.] The 
jurisdiction which the court retains in the original case, 
either by express reservation in its decree, or which it b", 
by authority of statute, to modify its judgment with reference 
to the custody and education of the children, or to make a 
new order in reference thereto, is not for the purpose of re-
imbursing her for any expenditures she may have voluntarily 
made in that behalf, but to provide for such expenses as may 
be subsequently incurred by reason of the direction that may 
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[11] An action for the future support of minor ebildren 
is a personal one. Being personal it is transitory. A transi-
tory action may be brought in any state where the defendant 
can be found. (7 Cal.Jur. 596, and cases cited.) [lOb] There 
is therefore no good reason for denying jurisdiction to enter-
tain this action insofar as it relates to the future support of 
the minor ebildren. The trial court has that jurisdiction. The 
question then is whether it has been properly exercised. 
The court found that at the times involved the defendant 
was a strong, healthy and able-bodied man; that "without 
justification or legitimate excuse," he has wilfully and de-
liberately abstained from reasonable efforts to obtain· gainful 
employment, and that he has earned, and is capable of earn-
ing, from five hundred dollars to one thoUsand dollars per 
month. 
[12] It is the defendant's contention that the foregoing 
findings are not supported by any substantial evidence in the 
record. With this contention we must agree. The undis-
puted evidence is that the defendant has no income and no 
assets; that he is and has been since the divorce in ill health 
and dependent on an aunt for support; that the only business 
in which he has been gainfully employed and experienced is 
the shipping business; that his employment in that busineBR 
was lost to him without his fault, and that he has since sought 
employment without success. There is no evidence to contra-
dict the defendant's statement that he has been and is in 
ill health, is dependent on an aunt for support, and is in-
capable of making a living. The finding is without sufficient 
evidentiary support. 
The defendant sought by cross-complaint to have it adjud~ed 
that certain real and personal property held in tlJ.e plaintiff's 
name was possessed by her in trust for the defendant. In 
the main this property consisted of a country estate in Con-
necticut of approximately 156 acres, including a 13-room 
home, an 8-room guest house, cabana house, three car garage, 
10 other garages, kennels, barns, a silo, shops, and other 
appurtenances and equipment. The property was alleged to 
have a value in excess of $75,000. Admittedly all of it was 
purchased with money belonging to the defendant. After the 
parties separated the pl.aintiff continued to live at the family 
home and eventually disposed of all of the property. At the 
time of the trial she still had $12,000 of the proceeds of the 
sale of the property. [13] It is the plaintiff's contention 
that she acquired the major portion of the property by gift 
526 DIXON t1. DIXON [40 O.2d 
from the defendant, and the remainder was neceasarily BOld . 
to rneet the defendant'R obligations. It is the defendant's posi-
tion that t.he parties never intended that transfers of the 
property to the plaintiff were to be absolute. On sharply 
conflicting but substantial evidence the trial court rnade 
findings in accordance with the plaintift's contentions with 
respect to the question of the execution and tinality of the 
gifts" and the disposition of the other property involved. Upon 
these findings the trial court properly concluded that the 
defendant take nothing by his cross-complaint . 
. The judgment for "the plaintiff on the cross-complaint is 
affirmed. In all other respects the judgment and the order 
~re reversed; neither party to recover costs' on appeal. 
Edmonds, J.," Oarter, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Ooncurringand Dissenting.-These appeals 
from the judgment of November 25, 1949, and the order of 
September 15,1950, bring into question six decisions of the 
trial court in favor of plaintiff: (1) judgment for .1,950 
as reimbursement for amounts spent for her own support 
after the Connecticut decree and before her remarriage ;(2) 
judgment for $1,850 as reimbursement for amounts spent 
for the support of the two minor children after the divorce 
decree and before commencement of this action; (8) judg-
ment for $87.50 per month for the support of each child 
from the commencement of the action until the child reaches 
majority; (4) judgment for $500 counsel fees and ~.15 
costs incurred in the trial of the action; (5) judgment in 
favor of plaintm on the cross-complaint; (6) order awarding 
plaintiff $750 counsel fees, $250 costs, and $37.50 per month 
for child support, to enable her to defend the appeal and to 
support the child who was still a minor. The majority 
opinion affirms (5); the rest of. the judgment and the order 
are reversed. One ground for reversal is that there is no 
evidence that defendant is able to rnake the payments ordered 
by the trial court. In addition, (1) is reversed on the ground 
that after dissolution of a marriage Oalifornia d~ not allow 
a former wife an action for her support, past or future, and 
(2) is reversed on the ground that an action for reimburse-
ment of past expenditures for child support will not lie. 
ln my opinion, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion 
in determining that defendant had the ability to pay the 
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the circumstances of this case defendant can be required to 
reimburse his former wife for debts incurred on behalf of 
their children. I do not agree that dissolution of a marriage 
by an ex parte decree necessarily bars a subsequent action 
for support, but I agree that the record does not sustain the 
allowance for plaintiff's past expenditures for her own sup-
port. I agree that the judgment in favor of plaintiff on the 
eross-complaint should be affirmed. I would affirm the judg-
ment and order except for that part of the judgment award-
ing plaintiff $1,950 for her past support.' . 
De!endaflt'; A'biUtfi 1o PGfI . 
The granting o~ denying of awards for suit money -and ebild 
support rests largely in the discretion of the trial court; 
its decision will not be disturbed on appeal withOUt" a clear 
showing of an abuse of that discretion. (Baldwin v. Baldwin, 
28 Cal.2d 406, 418 [170 P.2d 670]; Dickens v. Dickens, 82 
Cal.App.2d 717, 722 [187 P.2d 91].) In the present ease plain-
tiff's need, the children's need, and the reasonableness of the 
amounts awarded, were established by substantial evidence. 
An abuse of discretion is shown only if it is· established as a 
matter of law that the trial judge could not reasonably con-
clude that defendant had the ability to meet the payments. 
In determining the amount of the allowance under sections 
137, 187.5, 188, and 189 of the Civil Code, the trial judge 
must take into account the defendant's ability to pay. 
(Sweelefl v. Sweeley, 28 Cal.2d. 389, 394 [170 P.2d 469] ; 
Arnold v. Arnold, 215 Cal. 618, 615 [12 P.2d 485J.) . 'rhe 
orders, however, need not be based upon the actual income 
of the husband. They may be based solely upon his ability 
to earn money by the use of reasonable effort. (We'b'ber v. 
Webber,33 Cal.2d 153, 160 [199 P.2d 934]; EidenmuUer v. 
Eide.".fmtZler, 37 Cal. 364, 366; McGann v. MeGGnn, 82 Cal. 
App.2d 382, 389-390 fl86 P.2d 424].) Thus, in Tompki1&B v. 
To",pkifl.~, 83 Cal.App.2d 71 [187 P.2d 840], the court upheld 
an allowance of support against a husband who had not worked 
for many months, accepting the wife's contention that "a 
guilty party cannot avoid the responsibility for payment of 
alimony by the simpJe expedient of avoiding employment." 
(88 Ca1.App.2d at p. 79.) 
. The record establishes' that defendant had been employed 
as a steamship company executive for many years, earning 
from $500 to $1,000 per month. Since the divorce he has 
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had no money or property and that his aunt paid all his bills:. 
and gave him pocket money. Defendant was 47 years old at· 
the time of trial. When asked if he had made any efforts to ' 
get a job, he replied: "I had tried several times in New York. 
It is no easy thing to go in and get a job as president, the job 
that I had done; most companies have their own presidents." 
Defendant testified that he had high blood pressure and that 
his doctor had advised him not to work. The doctor was not 
ea1led as a witness and defendant'8 testimony regarding his . 
health was not corroborated; Plaintiff testified tbatde.:' 
fendant's health had been good during their marriage. De- . 
. fendant had an interest in the outcome of the case, and -it: 
was to his advantage to claim that he was unable to work. ' 
The trier of fact was entitled to disbelieve his testimony that' 
he was in poor health. (Hutk v. Katz, 30 Cal.2d 605, 609 
[184 P.2d 521] ; Blank v. Coffin, 20 Cal.2d 457,462 [126 P;2d 
868].) In an apposite case, a reduction of alimony was up-: 
held on the ground that the trial court "could judge from' 
the appearance of the {wife] as to whether she was or was not 
physically able to earn any part of the money necessary for . 
her own support. The replies of the [wife] • . . upon the' 
cold record indicate at least a lack of any real disposition 
on the part of the [wife J to earn any part of her own living." J 
, (Lamborn v. Lamborn, 80 Cal.App.494, 498 [251·P. 943]')j: 
Si.milarlY, in the present case the tr. ier of fact could conClUde. '. 
that it was defendant's distaste for physical exertion that . 
. precluded his obtaining employment. i . '~ 
In this proceeding we are not concerned with problems: 
'that might arise if defendant should refuse to pay the amounts' . 
'Ordered by the trial court. Under an early decision of this~ 
court a deliberate 'refusal to work could not be punished by' 
contempt (Ez parte Todd, 119 Cal. 57, 58 [50 P; 1071]), but 
ordinary judgment remedies would be available and the judg-
ment could be satisfied if defendant should inherit or other-, 
wise obtain property. Moreover, the threat of execution upon 
any subsequently acquired property (ct. ·Di Corpo v. Di Corpo, , 
33 Cal.2d 195,201 [200 P.2d 529]) might be sufficient to in-
duce defendant to work. 
. I am therefore of the opinion that the orders for suit money· 
and for future support of the children should be aftirmed. 
·Reversal of the judgment for support on the merits would not 
neeesaitate .reversal of the order awarding euit money. if the defendant'e 
ability to pay were established. (Weil v. Weil, 37 Ca1.2d 170, 790 [236 
P.2d 159); Go" v. G01l, 1t6 Cal. 237, 240 [79 P. 885).) 
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Since the awards for past support for the children and the 
wife are reversed on additional grounds these also must be 
considered. 
Cht'ld Support 
The majority opinion recognizes that a former wife having 
custody of minor children may bring an action for their future 
support. (Dixon v. Dixon, 216 Cal. 440, 442 [14 P.2d 497].) 
In my opinion, the judgment partially reimbursing the wife 
for debts incurred on behalf of the children for past support 
may also be sustained. 
Plaintiff testified that she did not own imy money or 
property at the time of trial, except for some stocks and 
bonds that had been pledged as security for her debts. Since 
the divorce she bas partially supported the children from her 
own funds. Moreover, she was compelled to borrow $7,100 
for support of the children, $3,900 from her father and $3,200 
from her second husband. The trial court ordered defendant 
to pay $1,850 toward meeting the past expenditures by 
plaintiff. . 
Section 137 of the Civil Code provides that when "a father 
wilfully fails to provide for his children, the mother of the 
children may, without applying for a divorce or maintenance 
for herself, maintain in the superior court an action against 
him solely for the support and maintenance of the children. "t 
Nothing in the statute shows that it is limited to actions for 
future support. 
It is contended, however, that section 138 of the Civil 
Code, as construed in McKay v. McKay, 125 Cal. 65 [57 P. 
677], bars the award in the present case. Section 138 is 
inapplicable here, since that statute applies to awards for 
child support in divorce proceedings brought in California 
courts. The controlling statute is not section 138 but sec-
tion 137, providing for actions for support of children in-
dependent of divorce actions. (Dixon v. Dixon, 216 Cal 
440, 443 [14 P.2d 497] j see, also, Foy v. Foy, 23 Cal.App. 
2d 543, 546 [73 P.2d 618].) In any event, the decisions 
construing section 138 do not support defendant's position, 
even by analogy. 
The first case to set forth the problem of reimbursement 
for past expenditures is Wilson' v. Wt1son (1873), 45 Cal. 
399. The divorce decree had not provided for the support 
t After this action arose, leetion 137 was amended. Provisions for 
ebild support are now found in leetion 187.1. (Statl. 1951, eb .. 1700, t 2.) 
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of the child. Two years after the decree the former wife 
BOught an order for reimbursement of expenditures already 
incurred. This court affirmed an order of the trial court 
in favor of the wife, relying on the applicable statute which 
provided that the court might "during the pendency of the 
action, or at the final hearing, or afterwards, make such 
order for the support of the wife, and maintenance and edu-
cation of the children of the marriage as may be just." 
(Stats. 1851, p. 187; Divorce Act, § 7.) The court pointed 
out that it might be ., for the interest and welfare of the . 
child, that his past as well as future support should be' 
. paid for by the defendant." (45 Cal. at p. 403.) In 1872, 
the statute was superseded by section 138 of the Civil Code, 
which then provided that the court might "before or after 
judgment give such direction for the custody, care, and edu-
cation of the children of the marriage as may seem neces-
sary or proper, and may at any time vacate or modify the 
same." In McKay v. McKay, np"a, (1899), it was held 
that an allowance for past expenditures could not be main- . 
tained under section 138. The Wilson case was not over-
ruled, but distinguished. on the ground that it was decided 
"prior to the adoption of the . codes, and under a statute 
which expressly authorized the court to make an order sub- , 
aequent to the judgment for the' maintenance of the children . 
of the marriage." (125 Cal. at p.69.) In 1905 section 138 
was amended to provide that the trial court might C C during' 
the pendency of the action, or at the final hearing, or at any 
time thereafter during the minority of any of the children of 
the marriage, make such order for the custody care, education, ' 
. maintenanee and support of such minor children ~ may , 
seem necessary or proper." In Jaeger v. Jaeger (1925), 
73 Ca1.App. '128 [238 P. 139], it was determined that the 
amendment was substantially the same as the 1851 statute 
that "had been judicially interpreted by the court in Wil-
BOft v. Wilson, supra. No intention to the contrary being 1 
shown, and the Wilson ease, in respect to the court's in-
terpretation of the law then in foree, not having been 
overruled, it may fairly be inferred that the legislature in-
tended that the amendment should bear the same interpreta-
tion which had been given to the original act." (73 Cal. 
App. at p. 136; sp.e Holmes v. McColgan, 17 Ca1.2d 426, 430 
rno P.2d 428].) 
The present action is based upon section 137, which pro-
vided at the time the complaint herein was med that the 
.. 
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wife may file an action "solely for the support and main-
tenance of the children." This language, the basis of the 
Wilson and Jaeger decisions, omitted the wording relied on 
in the McKay case. The conclusion is inescapable that an 
action for reimbursement for past expenditures for support 
and maintenance of children may be maintained under sec-
tion 137. 
In any event, even if the construction of section 137 urged 
by the majority opinion be adopted, we should sustain the 
action of the trial court in the present case. When the wife 
has unpaid bills at the time of suit, it is recognized that the 
trial court, in its discretion, may· require the former hus-
band to contribute toward repayment of the debts. As 
pointed out in Jaeger v. Jaeger, supra, 73 Cal.App. 128, 
135, the welfare of the children may require reimburse-
ment "to discharge her indebtedness and restore her credit" 
so as to "leave her free from embarrassment through exist-
ing wants or present indebtedness, obviate the necessity of 
devoting any part of the future allowance to the payment 
of such indebtedness, and so enable her "to live in the future 
upon the allowance provided for that purpose." The power 
of the trial court to order reimbursement to extinguish exist-
ing debts has been recognized in many other cases. (Gay 
v. Gay, 146 Cal. 237, 243 [79 P. 885] ; Lar,env.Larsen, 101 
Cal.App.2d 862, 865 [226 P.2d 650]; Younger v. Younger, 
112 Cal.App. 445, 446 [296 P. 1104] ; Reed v. Reed, 40 Cal. 
App. 102, 106 [180 P. 43].) 
At the time of trial the plaintiff was able to support the 
children only by borrowing from her father and from her 
second husband. Neither had any legal obligation to sup-
port the children. The trial judge could reasonably con-
clude that partial relief from past indebtedness was neces-
sary to restore plaintiff's credit, since the provision for $37.50 
a month for each child for future support would undoubt-
edly have to be complemented by further loans to plaintiff. 
The Wife's PGSt Support 
Plaintiff's suit for support from the date of the Connecti-
cut decree to the date of her remarriage is an independent 
action in equity to compel defendant to carry out the obli-
gation to support her that he assumed by his marriage. 
Plaintiff bases her action upon the theory that under the law 
of Connecticut she had a right to support at the. time of 
the divorce, that the question of that right was not and 
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could not be litigated in the divorce proceedings beca~ 
the Connecticut court did not have personal jurisdiction 
over defendant, that her right survived the divorce, and that 
the courts of this state have the power as courts of equity 
to recognize and enforce defendant's duty to support her. 
It is contended on behalf of defendant that an action for 
support depends upon the existenee of the marital relation 
and that dissolution of the marriage ends the right to sup-
port. Two theories are thus advanced to justify denial of 
the action by the former wife for support: (1) that the 
divorce teI1llinated the marriage status .and the duty·1fO 
support dependent thereon and (2) that a support order 
is obtainable only in an action for divorce or separate main~ 
tenance. . .. :,;\ 
In my opinion, the wife's right to support, although a~ 
ing out of the marriage, is not· lost by dissolution of the 
marriage unless it could. have been litigated in the proceed-
ings thereto; further, I believe that California courts have, 
jurisdiction to entertain proceedings in equity for support, 
independent of actions for divorce or separate maintenance. 
I cannot agree that an action by a former wife in such a 
situation as plaintiff's is barred simply because the parties 
are no longer married. 
By marriage l a husband assumes the duty to support his 
wife (Civ. Code, §§ 155, 174; Sanderson v. Niema'llln, 17 C~ 
2d 563, 568 [110 P.2d 1025] ; Title Ins. ct Trust Co. v. Inger- : 
Boll, 158 Cal. 474, 492 [111 P. 360] ; Chaffee v. Browne, 109 
Cal. 211, 219 [41 P. 1028]), a duty that is enforceable by 
the state (Pen. Code, § 270a) as well as by the wife.Al-
though that duty arises from the marriage, it is not neces-: 
sarily terminated by dissolution of the marriage. If the 
marriage is dissolved through the wrong of the husband, 
he may be compelled to support his former wife after the 
divorce. (Civ. Code, § 139.) The allowance of support fol-
lowing divorce "proceeds upon the theory that the husband 
entered upon an obligation which, among other things. bound 
him to support the wife during the period of their joint 
lives, and gave to her a right to share in the fruits and ac-
cumulations of his skilJ ; that by his own wrong he has forced 
her to sever the relation which enabled her to enforce thi!l 
obligation, and for the wrong which thus deprived her of 
the benefit of the obligation, he .must make her compensa-
tion." (Ex parle Spencer, 83 Cal. 460, 464 [23 P. 395, 17 
Am.St.Rep. 266] ; see Arnold v. Arnold, 76 Ca1.App.2d 877, 
) 
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885-886 [174 P.2d 674] ; Bemondino v.BemondMw, 41 Oal. 
App.2d 208, 213 [106 P.2d. 437].) 
If the divorce court has personal jurisdiction over the hus-
band, the wife has an adequate remedy in the divorce pro-
ceeding to obtain an allowance for support. If it does not, 
however, it may not award the wife support, although it 
may dissolve the marriage. (Baldwin v. Baldwin, 28 Oal. 
2d 406, 415 [170 P.2d 670].) In that situation a wife's right 
to support is not lost, since it has never been adjudicated. 
There is nothing in section 139 to indicate that it 'Was meant 
to provide the only remedy of the wife. A wets righi to 
support arises from the marriage and is 1'ecogniZed by stat-
ute. (Civ. Code, §§ 155, 174.) It is not created by a di-
vorce decree; the decree is simply one means of enforcing 
the right. 
It was settled at an early date that the power to award 
support falls within the inherent powers of a court of equity 
and exists independently of statutory authority. (Paxton 
v. Paxton, 150 Cal. 667, 670 [89 P. 1083]; IAtJingston v. 
Superior Oourt, 117 Oal. 633,635 [49 P. 836,38 L.R.A. 175] ; 
Galland v. Galland, 38 Oal. 265, 268; see, also, Murray v. 
Murray, 115 Oal. 266, 274 [47 P. 37, 56 Am.St.Rep. 97, 37 
L.R.A. 626].) "It may be admitted that where a statute 
creates a right and also prescribes a particular remedy or 
procedure for its enforcement, such procedure can alone be 
invoked for such enforcement; but that is as far as the rule 
goes. In such case the special procedure may be eonsidered 
as part of the right-limiting and conditioning it. But 'Where 
the right is given by statute without any prescribed remedy, 
it may be enforced by any appropriate method recognized 
by the general law of procedure. This principle is crystal-
lized in section 1428 of the OivilCode, 'Which provides that 
'an obligation arising from operation of law may be en-
forced in the manner provided by law, or by civil action, 
or proceeding.' And a wit in equity is peculiarly an ap-
propriate remedy for the enforcement of the duty imposed 
by said section." (Paxton v. Paxton, IUpra, 150 Oal. 667, 
670-671; see Tulare lrr. Dist., v. Superior Oourt, 197 Oal. 
649, 660 (242 P. 725].) 
The Paxton case involved section 206 of the Civil Code, 
imposing a duty upon parents to maintain adult children 
unable to support themselves. That section provided no 
remedy to enforce the right, but the court allowed an inde-
pendent suit in equity. The Livingston case, supra, involved 
) 
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section 176 of the Civil Code, giving a husband the right 
to support from his wife when. he was unable to support; 
himself; the court allowed an independent suit in equity .. 
to enforce that right. It bears noting that rules of law 
have likewise been developed to protect the rights of an in-
nocent person who enters into a husband and wife relation- . 
ship in the belief that there is a valid marriage, although 
the Legislature has not provided a statutory solution to the 
variety of problems that can arise from a putative spouse:. 
relationship. (See SanguineUi v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal.2d ~5,: 
99-100 {69 P.2d845, 111 A.L.R.M2]; Tukne#fe v. Turk~?, 
nette, 100 Cal.App.2d 271,274 [223 P.2d 495].)'·>' 
The social policy that impels a court to award support 
in a divorce proceeding when it has personal jurisdiction: 
over the husband also impels the cwurt to award support . 
when he is first brought before the court after the divorce. . 
Accordingly, many courts have held that an action for sup-
port may be maintained after a marriage has been dissolved 
by a court that lacked personal jurisdiction over one of the 
parties. (Turner v. Turner, 44 Ala. 437,451 ; Davis v. Davis, 
70 Colo. 37, 41 [197 P. 241]; Bodgers v. Bodgers, 66 Kan. 
483,488 {43 P. 779]; Pawley v. Pawley, - Fla. - [46 
So.2d 464, 472]; Woods v. Waddle,44 Ohio St. 449, 457 [8 
N.E. 297] ; COft v. COft,19 Ohio St. 502, 612 [2 Am.Rep. 416]; ·1' 
Searles v. Searles, 140 Minn. 385, 387 [168 N.W. 133] ; Craw- . 
ford v. CrGtDford, 158 Miss. 382,388 [130 So. 688]; Spradling" 
v. Spradling, 74 Okla. 276, 277 [181 P. 148]; Nelson v. NeZ- ' 
son, 71 S.D. 842 [24 N.W.2d 327, 329] ; Toncray v. Toncray,.\ 
~i.!~S.4::00~~IJ~::~~ D!~e~'~ ~C23~h=;J 
:·~i 
.P. 165]; Adams v. Abbott, 21 Wash. 29, 32 [56 P. 931]')j 
These decisions point out that it was impossible for the 
wife to recover an allowance for support at the time of the 
divorce decree because the court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion over the husband. If the question of support could not 
be litigated after dissolution of the'marriage, the wife would 
be forever denied her day in court, and the husband would 
be allowed to escape the obligations incurred by his mar-
riage. The wife'8 claim would be extinguished without an 
opportunity to present it for adjudication. In my opinion, 
the foregoing eases reach a sound result, and the majority 
opinion does not advance persuasive reasons to justify a 
denial to the former wife of an opportunity for adjudication 
of her claim to support from her former husband. 
) 
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It is contended that the action by the former wife should 
be denied when, as here, she obtained the decree, on the 
theory that she .. elected" to .. waive" her right to support. 
Many courts have rejected this reasoning. (Woods v. Wad-
dle, supra; Hutton v. Dodge, supra; Adams v . .Abbott, supra; 
Spradling v. Spradling, supra ; Nelson v. Nelson, ftpra.) 
In Hutton v. Dodge, supra, the court forcefully stated: "Let 
us assume, for instance, that in the present case plaintiff 
[wife] was not only entitled to a divorce and such property 
of defendant as was within the jurisdiction of the court, 
but to alimony as well. . She could not follow her husband 
into another state and obtain relief for she would first have 
to establish residence there before she could sue. She could 
not obtain a decree for alimony here because she could not 
make personal service of summons on defendant within this 
state. In such circumstances, what remedy would the plain-
tiff have' If there ever was a case in which litigation by 
piecemeal was justified because of the inherent difficulty of 
obtaining relief in one action, it seems to the writer that 
the case presented is almost a perfect example ..•. It would 
be a travesty upon justice and a sad commentary on the 
power of judicial tribunals generally if the courts were 
powerless to grant relief in 8 case of this kind where juris-
diction of the defendant is afterwards seasonably obtained 
and the rights of third parties have not intervened. We 
have no fault whatever to find with cases which hold that 
where full and complete jurisdiction has been obtained over 
the subject-matter and the parties, judgments rendered in 
divorce cases as well as others are res adjudicata as to every 
question that might have been litigated under the issues 
made. In such cases the only remedy for subsequent relief 
incident to the divorce seems to be by appropriate proceed-
ings in the case in which the divorce was granted. Not so, 
however, where jurisdiction of the person was not obtained." 
(58 Utah at pp. 232-234.) 
The former husband, however, is not foreclosed from liti-
gating the issue of his guilt in defending an independent 
action in equity for support by his former wife. The divorce 
decree obtained by constructive service is, of course, binding 
upon both parties insofar as marital status is concerned. 
(Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Ca1.2d 796, 801 [221 P.2d 1, 20 
A.L.R.2d 1152]; Estate of Hughes, 80 Cal.App.~d 550, 556 
[182 P.2d 253].) It does not follow, however, that the de-
cree adjudicated the husband's fault with regard to his duty 
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to support. .(Rest. Judgments, § 74; see Estate of Williams, 
36 Cal.2d 289, 292 [223 P.2d 248, 22 A.L.R.2d 716J.) The 
full faith and credit clause does not compel such a result 
(Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 [68 8.Ct. 1213, 92 L. 
Ed. 1561, 1 A.L.R.2d 1412J) ; moreover, such a result would 
create serious constitutional problems under the due process 
clause. (Rediker v. Rediker, supra, 35 Cal.2d 796, 803; 
see Mullane v. Oentral Ha·nover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 314 [70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865J.) "It would 
seem to follow as a corollary of the doctrine herein enunci-
ated that in such an action for alimony on the part of a 
plaintiff, the defendant would have the right in his defense 
to contest the merits of the divorce itself, not for the pur-
pose of setting it aside, but' for the purpose of defeating the 
alimony for which the action was brought. If the plaintift 
had the right to bring an independent action for alimony 
after a divorce has been granted simply because she never 
had and could not have her day in court in respect to ali. 
mony in the divorce proceedings, the defendant for the same 
reason should be entitled to his day in court respecting the 
same matter." (Hutton v. Dodge, supra, 58 Utah at p. 237.) 
The majority opinion discusses the California decisions at 
length and concludes that an action for support could not 
be maintained by a California wife after a divorce decree 
based upon constructive service. The cases cited, however, 
do not preclude an independeni suit in equity by a former 
wife for support after dissolution of the marriage in a pro· 
ceeding where the remedy under ,section 139 was unavail-
able. . 
No California case has squarely held that the action will 
lie, although there have been strong indications that it will. 
(Matter of McMullin, 164 Cal. 504, 507 [129 P. 773] ["it 
fell within the power of the wife under supplementary pro-
ceedings brought in this state with personal service upon 
the former husband to have procured . . . an award of the 
custody of the children, with provision for her own and 
their support"]; DeYoung v. DeYoung, 27 Cal.2d 521. 527 
[165 P.2d 457], concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Schauer 
["the right of a wife ... to support from the other spouse 
as of the date of the divorce is a property right which can 
be adjudicated only by a court having jurisdiction in per-
sonam"] ; Bernard v. Bernard, 79 Ca1.App.2d 353, 357 [179 
P.2d 6251.) 
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In some of the California cases relied upon for a contrary 
rule (Oolberl v. Oolberl, 28 Cal.2d 276, 279 [169 P.2d 633] ; 
OarbO'M v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.2d 768, 771 [117 P.2d 
872, 136 A.L.R. 1260]; Talbot v. Talbot, 218 Cal. 1, 2 [21 
P.2d 110] ; Hite v. Hite, 124 Cal. 389, 391 [57 P.2d 227, 71 
Am.St.Rep. 82, 45 L.R.A.793] ; Hinson v. Hinson, 100 Cal. 
App.2d 745, 746 [224 P.2d 405]), the action was for sup-
port pendente lite. The statements therein that marital 
status is a prerequisite to the granting of alimony are ir-
relevant to the issue presented by an action for support 
following an ex parte divorce. In such an action the former 
wife's recovery is of course predicated upon existence of 
the marital status at some' time before suit is brought The 
real question, however, is whether the relationship must con-
tinue until the date of suit. The cited cases do not supply 
an affirmative answer, for it is settled that suit money may 
be awarded in proceedings brought long after entry of the 
final decree of divorce. (Lerner v. Superior Courl, 38 Cal. 
2d 676, 685 [242 P.2d 321], and cases cited therein.) 
In other cases (Cardinale v. Cardinale, 8 Cal.2d 762, 768 
168 P.2d 351]; Patterson v. Patterson, 82 Cal.App.2d 838, 
842 {187 P.2d 113] ; Calhoun v. Calhoun, 70 Cal.App.2d 233, 
237 [160 P.2d 923]), the action was for separate maintenance. 
Separate maintenance can be awarded only during the' con-
tinuance of the marriage. As Mr. Justice Schauer noted in 
bis concurring opinion in DeYoung v. DeYoung, 27 Cal.2d 
521, 527 [165 P.2d 457]: "Separate maintenance di1fers 
from alimony in that it presupposes a continuing marital 
status. The right to it cannot be established without proof 
that such status is existent at the time of trial. . Proof of 
prior dissolution of the marriage is, therefore, a complete 
defense to such an action." (27 Cal.2d at p. 528; see, also, 
Monroe v. Superior Court, 28 Ca1.2d 427, 429 [170 P.2d 473].) 
Unlike separate maintenance, however, the obligation to sup-
port a former wife may continue after the marriage is dis-
solved. 
Cases are cited holding that when the divorce decree is 
silent as to an allowance for support, or the provision therefor 
is limited as to time, and power to modify is not reserved, 
further support payments cannot be ordered except upon 
appeal or application of section 473 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. (Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Ca1.2d 833, 841 [136 
P.2d 1] ; Long v. Long, 17 Ca1.2d 409, 410 [110 P.2d 383] ; 
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JleCZw.re v. MeClw.re, 4 Cal.2d 356, 359 [49 P.2d 584, 100 
A.L.R. 1257].) In these cases, however, the court had per-
sonal jurisdiction over the parties and the question of sup-
port had been or could have been litigated. These eases 
do nothing more than apply familiar principles of res judi-
cata. When, however, jurisdiction was obtained by con-
structive service, an in personam judgment for support could 
not be obtained. The question of the husband's obligation 
to provide for support of the wife was not and could not 
be litigated,and there is therefore no basis for res judicata. 
(See Rest. Judgments, § 74.)\ 
Two other California decisions require further discussion 
In Howellv. Howell (1894),104 Cal. 45, 47 [37 P. 770,43 Am. 
St.Rep. 70], the wife obtained a decree of divorce by COn-
structive service. An allowance for support could not be made. 
After the decree became final, the wife attempted to reopen 
the divorce action and obtain a modification of the decree to' 
provide for her support. The court held that the decree, 
having become final, could not be modified. The case turned 
on this procedural point, and the question whether the wife 
could bring an independent action in equity was not at- issue. 
The court stated, howe:ver, in a broad dictum that after the 
marriage ended an action for support could not be main-
tained. This dictum overlooked the fact that in the divorce 
proceeding the wife had no opportunity to litigate the issue 
of support and that the doctrine of res judicata therefore did 
not apply. The only California authority cited by the court 
was Egan v. Egan, 90 Cal. 15, 21 [27 P. 22], where the court! 
had personal jurisdiction over the parties. .. '.':1' 
In Calhoun v. Calhoun, npra, 70 Cal.App.2d 233, the hus-
band obtained a Nevada decree by constructive service. Sub-
sequently, the wife filed an action in California for separate 
maintenance, but did not question the validity of the Nevada : 
decree. The action by the wife was denied on the ground 
that separate maintenance could not be obtained after dis-
solution of the marital status. (See Cardinale v. Cardinale, 
supra.) The wife then filed an independent action in equity 
for support. A judgment in favor of the husband was affirmed. 
(Calhottn v. Calhoun, 81 Cal.App.2d 297 [183 P.2d 922].) 
The court, however. expressly left open the question whether 
the action could be maintained. (81 Ca1.App.2d at pp. 300-
301.) The court denied relief on the ground that at the time 
of the earlier action the wife had been aware of the Nevada 
decree and, once she elected to seek separate maintenance 
I 
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instead of an allowance for support, s'he would not be per-
mitted t.o barass her former husband by a multiplicity of 
actions. The Calhoun decision would be inapplicable when 
the former wife had no previous opportunity to recover an 
in personam jUdgment. 
If a valid ex parte divorce is granted the husband by an-
other state, the California wife may be protected only if she 
is allowed a subsequent action for support. California would 
of course be required to recogniZe that the marriage bad been 
dissolved by the ex parte decree (Williams v. North, Carolina, 
317 U.S. 287, 299 {63 s.et. 207, 87 L.Ed.279, 143 A.L.R. 
1273]), but the Constitution of the United States does not 
compel us to go farther and hold that the ex parte decree of a 
sister state destroyed the former wife's right to support. 
(Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 [68 s.Ct. 1213; 92 L.Ed. 
1561,1 A.L.R.2d 1412] ; Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555, 557 
[68 S.Ct. 1221, 92 L.Ed. 1572]; Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 
(U.S.) 582 [16 L.Ed. 226].) 'On the contrary, the require-
ment of the Williams case that the foreign decree be upheld 
strongly supports allowance of a subsequent action for support 
by a former wife. Formerly, when a husband obtained a 
foreign decree by constructive service the court would pro-
tect the wife by refusing to recognize the decree. (Haddock 
v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 606 [26 S.Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed. 867] ; 
Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 27, 37 [13 P.2d 719, 86 A.L.R. 
1321] .) Since the Williams case, a husband obtaining a bona 
fide domicile in another state may 'Secure a binding divorce 
decree by constructive service. (Williams v.North, Carolina, 
supra; Baldwin v. Baldwin, 28 Ca1.2d 40l>, 410-411 [170 P.2d 
670]; cf. Crouch, v. Crouch" 28 Cal.2d 243, 249 [169 P.2d 
897] .) If the wife's right to ~pport does not survive such 
an ex parte decree, she is compelled to protect that right in-
directly by making a collateral attack on the decree. There 
is no reason to drive her to such a cumbersome and perhaps 
futile extreme. The policy considerations that require recog-
nition of the foreign decree are not present when the question 
is the right to support. Since the courts have evolved rules 
of law that allow the husband readily to obtain a divorce, 
corresponding rules of law must be invoked to protect the wife 
and prevent injustice. Accordingly, we should give effect to 
an ex parte foreign decree obtained by the husband insofar 
as it affects marital status, but declare it ineffective on the 
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state by restricting it to matters of her dominant ~nce~ '" 
(Estin ". Estin, supra, 334 U.S. 541, 549.) .,' , 
For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that a 
former wife domiciled in California can bring an action for . 
support, either following a divorce decree granted her by A 
California court lacking personal jurisdiction over her former', 
husband, or following an ex parte decree granted her former.' 
husband by a foreign court. Although the present action is' 
by a nonresident wife subsequent to a divorce by a court of 
another state, there is no reason why the courts of this state', 
ahould not entertain the action. "Alimony can in its m&:':; 
cretion be granted by a court' under the law of its own state"; 
in favor of a spouse against any spouse who is personally 
subject or whose property is subject to the jurisdiction of the '~ 
court. " (Rest. Conflict of Laws, § 463; cf. HiMr v. HiMr~_ 
153 Cal. 254, 260 [94 P. 1044]; Wytlmv. Wpne, 20 Cal. " 
App.2d 131, 136 [66 P.2d 467].) ,Plaintitf invokes the' 
inherent powers of courts of equity in this state to protect' 
the rights of innocent persons and to prevent injustice., A ' 
former :wife in the position of plaintitf may have a jUst claiui ; 
to support from her husband upon dissolution of the mar~j 
riage. By the marriage he assumed the obligation of sup- j. 
porting his wife, and he should not be allowed to escape thai 
obligation by conduct that compels her to divorce him. The' 
wife is entitled to her day in court, to have a court of equity ': 
pass on the merits of her claim that ,her former husbancJ ~ 
should support her. If the courts of this state are closed .to:. 
her, the former husband may unconscionably avoid his oblig&:;' 
tions; if the action ·by the former wife is allowed, she .wD1: 
be able to present her claim for adjudication. Califo~ . 
should not serve as an asylum to the former husband. ",~~.~ 
A former wife, however, would not be permitted to bring , 
an action in California for support following an ex parte "1 
decree, if a similar action would not be entertained by courti'. 
of the state where she was domiciled at the time of the decree., 
If the wife was the plaintitf in the divorce action, and under '! 
the law of the state granting the decree the right did no.t " 
survive divorce, the full faith and credit clause would comJ)81; . 
California to give the same effect to the decree and hold that 1 
the decree not only dissolved the marriage status but ter- , 
minated the wife's right to support. On the other harid, if ! 
the husband obtains the decree in another state and under 
the law of the state of the wife's domicile her right to support 
was lost when the marriage status terminated, ahe would like-
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wise not be allowed, by migrating to another state, to revive 
a right that had expired. 
The foregoing considerations are not present, however, if 
the husband leaves the wife, and the state of the wife '8 
domicile holds that her right to support survives dissolution 
of the marriage. In that event, neither the full faith and 
credit clause nor reasons of policy would bar the action in 
a California court. Whether the wife obtains the decree in 
the state where she remains, or whether the husbanq. obtains 8 
valid decree in another state, we would be required to hold 
that the marriage status was dissolved (WiUitJms v.North 
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 299 [63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279, 143 
A.L.R. 1273 J ), but would not be required to deny the wife 
a right to bring an action in California for support and thus 
give the foreign decree greater effect in California than it 
would have in the state of the wife's domicile. 
The question remains whether the judgment may be sus-
tained on the merits. Under the Connecticut decisions, a wife 
granted a divorce for the misconduct of her husband may 
receive an allowance for her support, in the discretion of the 
trial court. (LaBeUa v. LaBella, 134 Conn. 312, 318 [57 A.2d 
627].) "Alimony is awarded the wife divorced for the fault of 
her husband that he may continue to fulfill the obligation 
for her support which the law imposed upon him in virtue of 
the marriage contract." (Cary v. Cary, 112 Oonn. 256, 260 
[152 A. 302].) "It is based upon the duty of the husband to 
continue to support a wife whom he has in legal effect aban-
doned." (Wright v. Wright, 93 Oonn. 296, 300 [105 A. 684].) 
In the present case, however, service of process was by regis-
tered mail in New York. Both parties agree that the in 
personam provisions of the Connecticut decree are invalid.· 
Plaintiff did not base this action upon the alimony provisions 
of the Connecticut decree and, in view of defendant's con-
cession, he waived any contention that plaintiff's right to sup-
·Service outside the state by registered mail is apparently permissible 
under Connecticut statutes (Conn. Gen. Stats., Bev. 1949. ~ 7330), but no 
decision of the highest court of that state has been called to our atten· 
tion and our research discloses none holding that an ttl "er8OM'" judg-
ment, like that in the present ease, obtained on such service 'Would be 
valid in Connecticut. (Of. OOcora v. Oi1cora, 133 Conn. 456, 459 [52 A.2d 
310]; Kohler v. Kohler, 12 Conn.Sup. 476; Sattler v. Sattler, 7 Conn. 
Sup. 179.) Such a judgment is not necessarily in violation of the United 
States Constitution. (Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 [61 S.Ct. 
339, 85 L.Ed. 278, 132 A.L.R. 1357]; but see De L4 M_tanya v. De L4 
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port was merged into the Connecticut decree and that "~~ 
exclusive remedy is an action thereon.~;. 
No Connecticut decisions have been discovered or cited by, 
the parties that directly pass on the question whether a wilt". 
domiciled in Connecticut at the time of an ex parte divorce 
decree may subsequently bring an action for support. The,' 
Connecticut courts, however, follow the same rule as do the, 
California courts and hold that the duty of the husbani' 
to support his wife may be continued after dissolution of the' 
marriage as part of the obligations assumed by the mar~~ 
(LaBella v. LaBella, supra; Cary v. Cary, supra.) In~' 
absence of announcement of the law of Connecticut by ,~~~ 
highest court of appellate jurisdiction of that state (Cod~. 
Civ. Proc., § 1875(3) ; see Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal . .3~2"" 
366 [10 P.2d 63, 84 .A..L.R. 1264] ; Knox v. Pryor, 10 Cal.App~ 
2d 76, 78 [51 P .2d 106]), we may assume that Connectic~~'~ 
would reach the same result as would California, and tha~4 
Connecticut would protect the wife and not deny her ,th~i' 
right to present her claim to support for adjudication. (Q ", 
German v. German, 122 Conn. 155, 163 [188 A. 429].) <.1~ 
'In Connecticut, as in California, a former wife canno.~: 
obtain an allowance for support if the divorce is granted fO~':1 
the misconduct of the wife. (Allen v. Allen, 43 Conn. 419,426/ 
Geer v. Geer,8 Conn.Sup. 279, 282.) As previously poin~ 
out, defendant could have litigated the issue of his guilt,~ 
the present proceeding. At the trial, a copy of the COnnecticu .... t : 
decree was admitted in evidence, providing that the divor~ 
was granted plaintiff on the ground of defendant's "intol~ 
able cruelty," and the case apparently was tried on the theo~ 
that the Connecticut decree settled that issue. Defen ,., 
did not contend at the trial or on appeal that the decree .iJD..n' 
properly granted plaintiff the divorce. ( '. 
The award in the present case was for past support and nolo 
for future support. An action by a former wife for reima 
bursement of past expenses for her own support is not barred 1 
as a matter of law. Since she was unable to obtain an allow:~ 
ance for support until personal service could be made on he~ ~ 
former husband, she should, absent proof of laches or th~.~ 
bar of a statute of limitation, in a proper case be allowed.~ 
reimbursement, as well as an award of future support. Other~, \ 
wise, a premium would be placed on the ability of the former : 
husband to escape service of process. The former wife ean-
not, however, obtain greater relief in a subsequent action for 
support than she would have received had the divorce eom:\ 
/ 
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had personal jurisdiction over the former husband. She did 
not haye at the time of the Connecticut decree an absolute 
right to continued support from her former husband; she 
had only a right to have a court pass on the merits of her 
claim that her husband should support her after the mar-
riage had been dissolved. Since the former husband could 
have defeated or reduced a claim for support at the time of 
the divorce by showing that the amount claimed was not 
needed by the wife or that he did not have the ability to pay 
it, he similarly could contest a subsequent action for reim-
bursement for past expenses. Likewise, since an award made 
at the time of the decree could be increased or decreased by 
the divorce court on the ground of changed circumstances, 
either party can introduce evidence to show events that have 
occurred between the date of the divorce and the date of the 
action for support and that bear on the question of the amount 
of past support that should be awarded. 
The final problem is whether the evidence in the present 
case justifies the amount of past support awarded plaintiff. 
The trial court in making an award for support, or in 
modifying an award on the ground of changed circumstances, 
must take into consideration the needs of the wife and the 
ability of the husband. It appears from the record in the 
present case that after defendant left plainti1I she sold the 
property in Connecticut that had been purchased with de-
fendant's money, but placed in her name, and that, insofar 
as expenses for her own past support were concerned, plain-
tiff was never in need before her remarriage. Nevertheless, 
the trial court awarded her $1,950 for past support. Addi-
tionally, the awards for child support and suit money 
amounted to approximately $3,400 outright plus $37.50 per 
month for each child for future support. The evidence of 
defendant's ability to pay that sum, although sufficient to 
sustain the awards, is decidedly weak. When the evidence of 
plaintiff's need and defendant's ability to pay the additional 
$1,950 are viewed together, it is apparent that the award re-
imbursing plaintiff for expenses for. her own support cannot 
be sustained. (See Rawley v. Rawley, 94 Cal.App.2d 562, 
564 [210 P.2d 891] ; Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 81 Cal.App. 
2d 380, 382 [184 P.2d 7].) 
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the affirmance of the 
judgment in favor of plaintiff on the cross-complaint, and 
in the reversal of that part of the judgment awarding plain. 
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the evidence is insufficient to sustain the award. I dissent 
from the reversal of the judgments in favor of plaintiff in 
her actions for suit money and past and future child support, 
and from the Dlajority opinion insofar as it holds that the 
trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's 
action for her support. 
SCHAUER, J., Concurring.-I concur in the judgment and 
also in the majority opinion except insofar as some expres-
,&ions in the latter (unnecessary to the conclusion) may be, 
deemed to indicate a view inconsistent with that expressed 
by Dle in a concurring opinion in DeY OUfl{J v. DeYouftJl' , 
(1946), 27 Oa1.2d 521, 527 [165 P.2d 457]. . ; 
In the DeYoung case I said: U In a divorce action in a ; 
foreign state upon constructive service the court there has ' 
authority to adjudicate status (in rem) of a person residing 
in that state but has not jurisdiction to adjudicate away (in 
personam) any of the then vested property rights of the J 
absent spouse who does not reside in such state, who is not . 
personally served with process in that state and who does not : 
appear in the action. The personal rightS of the spouses in 
property not within the jurisdiction of the acting court re-
main subject to litigation in the proper forUm. It seems to me, 
that the right of a wife, or in a proper case the husband, ' 
to support from the other spouse as, of the date- of the divo~ ~ 
is a property right which can be adjudicated only by a court. 
having jurisdiction in personam.;; 
"The above stated view does not necessarily con1lict witq ~ 
the well established proposition that a court having juris:, 
diction over a domiciliary may adjudicate his marital statuf 
in rem and that (assuming due process) as an incident Of 
the change of status any rights to future accruing suppoi{ 
dependent upon a continuing marital Btatus no longer accme" , 
because the status no longer exists." , . :~'" 
It is obvious from the quoted language that it has DO,! 
application to a case such as the instant one in which it was .' 
the plaintiff herself who upon substituted service in Conneeti- . 
cut sought and procured the decree changing her status. She; 
chose the forum and must be charged with knowledge of. 
the limitations upon what relief she might Pt and also with ' 
knowledge of the character and extent of the rights which she 
would, or might, lose by bringing her action in that forum. 
In bringing that action she submitted herself to the juris;J 
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the litigation she instituted. Her.'''' personam rights growing 
out of or dependent on the marital status are not in that case 
terminated by any act of. the husband or without her having 
her day in court but, rather, are ended by her own act in 
bringing and prosecuting the suit to terminate the marriage, 
and procuring and accepting the judgment which does dis-
solve it. 
If the plaintiff here had wished to bring in California a 
personal action against her husband in respect to property 
rights growing out of or dependent upon the marital status, 
including the right of support, she could have brought such 
an action during the marriage regarqIess of her lack of resi-
dence in California. The fact that California, like most other 
states, has Elnacted legislation requiring a specified minimum 
period of residence before an action for divorce, as dis-
tinguished from an action for support, may be maintained 
should not be regarded as an excuse for permitting a plaintiff 
voluntarily and unnecessarily to split a cause of aetion and 
try the sections pieeemeal in as many states as fancy dictates. 
If there is to be a divorce at all it is the better public 
policy that the decree of divorce shall settle for all time 
all the rights and obligations of the parties to the dissolved 
marriage to the end that litigation arising from such marriage 
shall end and be known to have ended, and that the parties 
may have an opportunity to build to a future, free from, and 
perhaps the better for, the past, rather than to be wrecked 
by recurring litigation. Except, then, where there is a com-
plete jurisdietional failure, as was the situatioll. mentioned in 
the DeYoung ease in respect to the personal property rights 
of the absent spouse, the courts and legislatures should look 
with disfavor on delayed litigation between former spouseR 
seeking to assert rights growing out of the status which has 
long since been dissolved. 
40 C.2cl-18 
